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Abstract
As one of about eight countries that supply nuclear materials and equipment for
nuclear energy development to the rest of the world, the United States also requires some
of the most stringent nonproliferation measures of its prospective clients. In 2009, the
United States signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates
(UAE). Under the terms of the agreement, the UAE foreswore developing sensitive fuel
cycle technologies on its own soil in exchange for the ability to receive U.S.-origin
materials and equipment. The Kingdom of Jordan is also seeking to develop a nuclear
energy program in the face of its growing energy needs. However, it has refused to sign
an agreement with the same restrictive terms as the UAE’s. This thesis seeks to
understand why the UAE has signed an agreement while Jordan has not. It argues that the
driver of the different outcomes is the two countries’ respective power positions in the
international system. This preliminary result seems to imply that contrary to some
vigorous arguments in the U.S. policymaking community, the U.S. will have less
leverage over global nonproliferation policy if it adopts a one-size-fits-all nuclear trade
policy.
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Chapter One: Jordan’s and the UAE’s divergent choices for nuclear cooperation with the
United States
Introduction
As countries around the world seek to meet growing energy demand with nuclear
power, a corresponding question is whether the international nuclear nonproliferation
regime can meet the challenges associated with technology diffusion. Suppliers of
nuclear technologies must decide whether they are willing to engage in trade that would
allow non-nuclear countries to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle, a prospect that would
also necessarily afford them the technologies to make nuclear weapons. For its part, the
United States, has one of the most restrictive export regimes, requiring its prospective
customers to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement (NCA). Among other things, NCAs
restrict U.S.-origin “special nuclear material”1 from being enriched or reprocessed
without prior approval.2 Uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, done at the
front and back ends of the nuclear fuel cycle, respectively, are processes that are
necessary to make a nuclear bomb; they are particularly troublesome from a proliferation
standpoint because countries that seek to make nuclear weapons can use these
technologies to cover up diversion of materials to a clandestine weaponization program.
U.S. NCAs do not guarantee trade; they simply allow for transfer of U.S. nuclear
materials to occur with other countries under U.S. law.
1 U.S. Library of Congress, CRS, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by Mary Beth Nikitin and Paul Kerr, CRS Report RS22937 (Washington,
DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, June 19, 2012), 1. Special nuclear material means plutonium or enriched uranium in the isotopes 233 or
235.

2 Ibid, p. 2

1

In 2009, the United States signed an unprecedented NCA with the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), under which the UAE forswore enrichment and reprocessing of all
nuclear materials, not just those received from the United States. As a state party to the
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the UAE thus gave up its
“inalienable right” to “develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination…”3 Another Middle Eastern country, Jordan,
has resisted signing a NCA with the United States that would include the same provisions
on enrichment and reprocessing as the UAE’s.
U.S. NCAs have both real and symbolic benefits for the client state. First, they
allow for U.S. nuclear material transfers; second, as the strictest agreements in the world,
the client receives internationally recognized nonproliferation credibility.4 However, the
United States’ heightened requirements in their agreements – that is, that U.S. NCA
clients must forswear indigenous uranium enrichment on the front end and reprocessing
fuel on the back end not just of U.S.-origin materials but of any other origin material as
well – have had a tangible effect on the United States’ ability to conclude them. Potential
and existing nuclear trading partners have had second thoughts about whether the benefits

3 “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” April 22, 1970, The International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC 140, 3. Emphasis mine; it is important
to note that the US-UAE NCA has two provisions that lessen the impact of the deal. First, the agreement’s “Agreed Minute” states that UAE may renege on the deal
if another Middle East country signs a NCA without similar no enrichment and reprocessing provisions. Second, while Article 7 of the agreement states that the UAE
commits to the non-acquisition of sensitive nuclear facilities, Article 12 of the agreement reads that the commitment does not forsake the UAE’s fundamental rights
under the NPT. (Early (2013), p. 278, note 52). However, this paper is interested in the commitment the UAE made and why Jordan is not making a similar one.
4 Chen Kane, “US nuclear cooperation agreements and the Middle East,” Arms Control and Regional Security For the Middle East Blog, entry posted on August 3,
2012, http://www.middleeast-armscontrol.com/2012/08/03/us-nuclear-cooperation-agreements-and-the-middle-east/ (accessed May 14, 2013).
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of trade and/or international approval are incentive enough to relinquish their rights to a
full nuclear fuel cycle.5
Conventional wisdom tells us that alliances, especially in the Middle East, matter
a great deal to Middle East foreign policy calculations. Indeed, as Chen Kane argues,
ANY nuclear cooperation agreement with the
United States is about why the country needs or
wants the U.S. blessing or cooperation for its
nuclear energy program and what leverage the
United States has over these countries. And as far as
I know, the United States has leverage, be it
military, political or economic, over many countries
in the Middle East.6
However, the United States’ leverage over its weaker and less powerful allies does not
seem to be as important as one may think.
This study is about what is driving the disparate outcomes in Jordan and the UAE
in terms of their decisions to conclude NCAs with the United States. Jordan is among the
states that have decided not to sign the U.S. NCA despite its strong alliance with the
United States and desire to move forward with a nuclear energy program. On the other
hand, the UAE is also closely allied with the United States, but it signed an
unprecedented agreement, giving up its right to a full nuclear fuel cycle.
The paper makes two assumptions. First, the NPT regime’s guiding principle that
states, rather than the market, should control the international movement of nuclear
technology (unlike in other areas of international trade) provides a space for smaller and

5 Fred McGoldrick, The U.S.-UAE Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: A Gold Standard or Fools Gold? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, November 30, 2010).

6 Kane (2012, A)
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weaker states to succeed in negotiations with more powerful states. Second, because
states in the international nonproliferation regime have greater authoritative control of the
transfer of materials, they can make calculations vis-à-vis bilateral trade agreements that
they perceive will help their long-term power positions in the international system.
In relation, then, to the two cases under review here, I argue Jordan and the
United Arab Emirates based their decisions to conclude nuclear cooperation agreements
with the United States on power-relational rather than economic or political
considerations. Put another way, the two countries power positions in the international
system drove their decisions. Even though concluding an NCA with the United States
may help Jordan gain economically in the short run by allowing it to move forward with a
nuclear program more quickly, doing so would keep Jordan more dependent on
international assistance than if it were able to exploit its natural uranium reserves for
eventual fuel export. On the other hand, while it may have been economical for the
United Arab Emirates to develop an indigenous uranium capacity as part of its nuclear
power program, the UAE had a greater interest in the ability to overcome its history as an
enabler of nuclear proliferation and thus quickly develop a nuclear power program.
The link between sovereign decision-making and the nonproliferation regime is
manifested through Article IV of the NPT. Article IV provides the right of any state to
develop a full nuclear fuel cycle on its soil. Most nuclear materials are not sold on an
open international market; materials, technology, and know-how are controlled primarily
by states. In this way, Krasner refers to the nonproliferation regime as “authoritative.” As
such, Krasner argues, it is “more likely that a durable, mutually acceptable pattern of
4

behavior will established.” States agree on the regime’s “basic norms and principles” so
states can expect to resolve agreements within the regime’s framework.7 Moreover, the
NPT has one of the most extensive participation rates of global treaties, adding to the
“buy-in” on norms and principles. The Article IV norm is strongly held by many NPT
states parties and is seen as a point of leverage over nuclear weapons states and other
suppliers (most of whom are in the developed world) that wish to curtail transfers of fuel
cycle technologies. Indeed, as part of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 120 members of
the Non-Aligned Movement issued a statement that said of Article IV’s guarantee to
“research, produce, and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, “…NAM States
Parties do not see any room for reinterpretation or setting of conditions for the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.”8

Figure 1
7 Stephen Krasner, Structural Conflict (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 287-290.

8 United Nations, Non-Aligned Movement Statement before the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons Treaty, given by
H.E. Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (New York, 2010), 4.
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Source: World Nuclear Association

There are two interrelated implications of this research, one for U.S. policy and
the other for prospects for internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle -- an arrangement
whereby states would no longer have sovereign control over the production of nuclear
fuel. With regard to the first, the question among American policymakers is whether the
UAE NCA should be the “Gold Standard”9 or whether new or renewed agreements
should be negotiated on a case-by-case basis. Proponents of the Gold Standard argue that
the dangers of nuclear technology proliferation necessitate a strict U.S. position on
enrichment and reprocessing and that the benefits of doing business do not outweigh this
imperative. Opponents of the Gold Standard may agree that the diffusion of nuclear
technology is dangerous, but argue that the competitive international nuclear industry
leaves the U.S. with little leverage to dictate terms.10
Based on this paper’s finding that autocratic states participating within the
existing structure of the nuclear nonproliferation regime base their fuel cycle decisions on
their strategic positions rather than purely economic or political reasons, I argue that the
Gold Standard approach should be abandoned. It appears that without providing better
incentives, U.S. policy will not be able to dictate nuclear fuel cycle terms to new or
existing nuclear power countries. Even (or especially) if the U.S. continues to implement
a case-by-case policy with regard to nuclear cooperation agreements, it should not allow
NCAs to become an end rather than a means to more effective global nonproliferation
policy. I argue that the changes in U.S. leverage, the increased demand for new nuclear
9 Jessica Varnum, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation as Nonproliferation: Reforms, or the Devil You Know?” note 5, (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Institute, November
27, 2012). http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/us-nuclear-cooperation-nonproliferation-reforms-or-devil-you-know/ (accessed May 30, 2013).

10 Kane (2012 A)
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energy development, and the expansion of existing nuclear energy programs necessitates
a genuine U.S. effort to enact a global multilateral nuclear fuel cycle arrangement where
states would get their fuel from an independent entity. However, if countries are making
decisions based on their relative power positions within the international system, and how
changes to the regime would affect those positions, such an arrangement would need to
ensure that all participating states would be provided fair and equitable treatment.
The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows. The rest of Section I will
expound on the above argument, describe how other theories would explain the
outcomes, provide a brief rationale for the research question, and describe the
comparative method used. Sections II and III present the two cases, providing evidence
for the arguments above and alternative explanations that appear less likely. The final
section, Section IV, will provide an overview of the arguments, demonstrate the
overarching challenges to the nonproliferation regime in greater detail, and present policy
implications and recommendations based on the case studies.
The argument: The power-maximizing tendencies of states and international regimes
This study adopts the Realist assumptions that states are rational actors and will
seek to maximize their power in the international system under conditions of anarchy. In
the absence of an overarching order, states find it difficult to trust one another and will
revert to acting in ways that support their own interests. As a result, cooperation among
states can often be difficult. Jervis explains the dilemma as follows:
States must worry that others will seek to take advantage of them;
agreements must be crafted to minimize the danger of double crosses;
the incentives that operate when agreements are signed may be quite
different when the time comes for them to be carried out; and both

7

promises and threats need to be made credible.11

In a Realist paradigm, a state’s economic choices are fundamentally, in the end,
about a political motive.
National interest may at times be influenced by the peculiar economic
interests of classes, elites, or other subgroups of the society; but factors
of geography, external configurations of power, and the exigencies of
12
national survival are primary in determining foreign policy.

The Realist argument emphasizes that international trade occurs not because it is in both
states’ interests (though, sometimes it is) but rather because the hegemon has dictated a
system that works for it and weaker states are often forced to opt into the system. Gilpin
argues, “In the absence of economic and especially the political influence of the
hegemonic power, the system would fragment into autarkic economies or regional
blocs.”13
Thus, Realist theory would expect a state to pursue economic power in the service
of its national interests. This means we should expect states to “seek to diversify their
economies and lessen dependence on others, thereby reducing their vulnerability to
economic coercion, and obtain a larger share of the gains produced by…the relative gains
from trade.”14 Lake notes there are two primary ways a state can grow its economy: trade
and capital transfers. He argues that while trade can enhance national and global welfare,
only capital transfers can increase economic power.15 This is especially true in countries

11 Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” International Security, 24, no. 1 (1999): 42-63, 43-44.

12 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975, 28.

13 Gilpin, 33
14 David A. Lake, “Power and the Third World: Toward a Realist Political Economy of North-South Relations,” International Studies Quarterly, 31, No. 2 (Jun.,
1987) No. 31, 217-234, 228
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with a surplus of labor and little capital in that trade exacerbates specialization –thereby
enhancing economic welfare – and therefore precludes diversification of the economy.
Moreover, labor-intensive products add little to the value chain of production, whereas
capital-intensive goods “are usually high value added manufactured goods early in their
product cycles. Through learning or by stimulating technological innovation, such goods
often produce significant positive externalities.”16
Krasner (1985) also argues that developing states, on the whole, prefer more
“authoritative” as opposed to market-oriented modes of allocation.17 Authoritative
modes of allocation include direct allocation of resources by political authorities or
indirect allocation by limiting private actors, such as corporations from entering the
market.18 By adopting authoritative modes of allocation, leaders are better able to hedge
against exogenous shocks that may cause unrest and instability, as well as declines in
material well-being.19 Thus, contrary to an “economistic” notion that political power is
subordinate to wealth-maximization, Krasner’s self-styled “modified realist” contention
is that “in international forums concerned with global regimes, the most important
motivation of the Third World is to reduce vulnerability by supporting principles, norms,
and rules that legitimate authoritative allocation rather than market-oriented allocation.”20
Krasner uses this contention to explain why, in the 1970s, the developing world banded
15 Lake, 229
16 Lake, ibid

17 Krasner, 5

18 Ibid, 5

19 Krasner, 6

20 Krasner, 306
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together to pursue the “New International Economic Order,” a proposal to change the
dominant “liberal” paradigm governing international economic exchange.
Three variables highlighted by Kranser as important to the success of
international regimes appear to characterize the development and current state of the
international nonproliferation regime. First, as has been mentioned, the regime is
governed by state- rather than market control of nuclear materials, technology, and knowhow. Second, developing countries (i.e., the less powerful states) have a cogent and
unified voice as regards their demands of the developed world. Third, the power-wielding
states, particularly the United States, must have relatively less influence over existing
regimes.21
Briefly, I will cover these three features of the nonproliferation regime –statecontrolled trade, “weak” state grievance cogency, and the limited influence of powerful
states -- in more detail. Early efforts to internationalize nuclear trade –i.e. establish a
supranational agency that would control the means of production of the nuclear fuel
cycle and dispense licenses to countries wishing to pursue nuclear energy22 -- failed
because the international environment did not allow for states to trust that all parties
would follow through on commitments to hand over their resources. The result has been
the establishment of two formal institutions -- the International Atomic Energy Agency,
established in 1957, and the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),

21 Kranser, pp. 7-10
22 Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare, (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) 17. U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, “Milestones:
(1945-1952) http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/BaruchPlans.
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which entered into force in 1970 -- that set the rules and norms of the international
nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Essentially, the regime created two distinct classes of states: those possessing
nuclear weapons and states legally prohibited from possessing them. Within the regime
they are known as nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non nuclear weapons states
(NNWS). While the regime is inherently discriminatory, a grand bargain was negotiated:
Article IV of the NPT dictated that NNWS would have NWS assistance with
indiscriminate access to development of the nuclear fuel cycle and NWS would take steps
to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. At the time, the Article IV requirement stemmed, in
part, from the fact that technical knowledge about nuclear power was concentrated
among very few countries, including the United States and Russia.23
From the 1970s to 1990s, the normal process of technology, materials, and
knowledge transfer in the nuclear arena spurred familiar tensions regarding the spread of
the fuel cycle: nuclear suppliers attempted to control the supply nuclear technologies and
materials over the protests of non-nuclear weapons states.24 However, members of the
regime were willing to work within its confines because, as Krasner argues, “the North
and the South…agree[d] that the international movement of nuclear technology and
material must be subject to state decisions rather than the market.”
With the nonproliferation regime’s accepted norms and principles allowing for
relative negotiating parity between “weak” and “strong” states, in negotiating with the
United States on nuclear cooperation agreements, Jordan and the UAE took decisions
23 Joseph A. Yager, International Cooperation in Nuclear Energy, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution) 1981.

24 Krasner, 289.
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based on their resource endowments. As Lake argues, Realism would expect weaker
states to conduct trade that would bolster their international power positions, that is,
allowing them greater economic independence. Jordan is a country with “few natural
resources and a small industrial base” and its economy is heavily dependent on “external
aid from abroad, tourism, expatriate worker remittances, and the service sector.”25 In
other words, we would expect Jordan to seek to develop any and all value-added
resources it has in order to diversify its economy. In the words of Jordan’s leading
nuclear energy official, enrichment is “the source of strength in its nuclear program.”26
Without it, the program would not necessarily be worth pursuing. We would also expect
the UAE to engage in trade that would continue the economic independence the UAE has
enjoyed from its vast oil reserves. For the UAE, one path to maintaining economic
independence is the development of a nuclear power program. It needed U.S. approval, in
the form of the cooperation agreement, to move forward with a nuclear energy program
and overcome questions about its involvement in proliferation of nuclear weapons after
serving as a transshipment hub in the A.Q. Khan Proliferation network.
Other International Relations Theories and Nuclear Cooperation
Liberalism and its variants
Liberals contend that wealth accumulation rather than power per se motivates
rational actors, including states. Liberals also believe that states’ interests are

25 U.S. Library of Congress, CRS, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report RL33546, (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and
Publishing) April 9, 2010, 7.
26 Allison MacFarlane, “Where, How, and Why Will Nuclear Happen? Nuclear ‘Renaissance’ Discourses from Buyers and Suppliers,” in Adam Stulberg and
Matthew Furhmann (editors), Nuclear Renaissance and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2013), 58
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harmonious27 and therefore international trade will produce mutually beneficial economic
effects resulting, eventually, in the end of interstate conflict. Thus, states would be
expected to act in ways that maximize their wealth rather over their power in the
international system. If we were to look at the cases of Jordan and the UAE through a
Liberal lens, we would expect the opposite outcomes, or at the very least, we would not
expect the outcomes observed. Jordan would have no reason not to engage in an NCA
with the United States because indigenous uranium enrichment only becomes cost
effective when a state can capably produce 10 gigawatts of nuclear power. Jordan’s plans
entail producing ~3 GW of nuclear power by 2025.28 Although Jordan wishes to exploit
its domestic uranium reserves, wealth maximization rather than economic independence
would be Jordan’s primary motivator. We might expect the UAE to pursue other actors,
such as Russia, that would trade with the UAE setting conditions on development of the
full nuclear fuel cycle.
An offshoot of liberalism is neoliberal institutionalism, which attempts to account
for states’ cooperation behavior. As Jervis points out, the difference between realism and
neoliberalism is over states’ motivations for conflict and cooperation and the
corresponding ways in which cooperation might be achieved.29 Like realism, neoliberal
institutionalism holds that conflict is the result of insufficient information about actors’
intentions. However, unlike realists, neoliberals believe that institutions – whether formal

27 Gilpin, 27
28 Sharon Squassoni, “Mapping Nuclear Power’s Future Spread” (Chapter 2) in Henry Sokolski (ed), Nuclear Power’s Global Expansion: Weighing It’s Costs and
Risks, Strategic Studies Institute, 69.

29 Jervis, pp. 42-43
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or informal – are the desired mechanism to help states overcome information
asymmetries.30 In the absence of formal institutions, states can signal to each other
credible commitments by sending “costly signals” that demonstrate a state is willing to
incur a cost that it might not have otherwise in order to participate in war or to
cooperate.31 One example of costly signals is an audience cost, or the political fallout
from leaders reneging on their commitments.32
Stulberg (2013) argues that it is particularly difficult for states to signal intentions
regarding cooperation on multilateral nuclear approaches (MNAs), i.e., arrangements that
would require states to give up sovereign fuel cycle rights.33 He suggests that the credible
commitment problem arises for several reasons. First, MNAs create varying reputational
costs for different actors. Thus, “it is not clear a priori what the meaning of reputation is
for a customer state, whether it works as a single identity, how states manage multiple
reputations across different issue areas and which reputation matters most for nuclear
energy bargaining.”34 Second, MNAs hold different status for different countries. No
single regime type can be said to have a preference for MNAs, thus complicating “the
ability of nuclear suppliers and customers to convince one another of the normative or

30 Jervis

31 James D. Fearon, Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41, No. 1, (Feb.,1997): 68-90, 69.

32 Fearon, 69
33 Adam Stulberg, “Confronting the Credible Commitment Problem,” in Adam Stulberg and Matthew Furhmann (editors), Nuclear Renaissance and International
Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2013).

34 Stulberg, pp.102-103
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domestic political costs that they would incur by reneging on nuclear obligations.”35
Third, even benignly motivated suppliers and customers cannot signal that they will not
renege on fuel supply commitments: history shows that political changes have indeed
affected a number of nuclear fuel transactions, in turn creating unacceptable costs for one
or both of the parties.36 As a result, states cannot signal “ex ante” that changes to the
commitments will not occur “ex post.”
Stulberg argues that successful MNAs hinge on the customers’ projected future
reliance of its nuclear energy program as part of its overall reliance on energy coupled
with the suppliers’ share of market power – as a measure of the power dynamic between
the customer and supplier. Future reliance would be important for the state’s ability to
secure an agreement because “the more reliant a state expects to be on nuclear power for
its energy security, the more important it will become to secure a steady fuel supply.”
Trust issues are compounded if the supplier’s share of the market grows “too large”
(Stulberg estimates the threshold at 25 percent). Even if its intentions are benign, a
prospective nuclear trading partner becomes untrustworthy when it has a large enough
market share.
Under this framework, one would expect the UAE and Jordan to face similar
prospective trading partners – all options would be open -- but have a different reliance
on nuclear energy as part of their overall energy source. Jordan’s reliance would be
greater and therefore we would expect it to have more difficulty trusting its prospective
partners. The UAE, on the other hand, has more ability to engage in agreements because
35 Stulberg, p. 105

36 Ibid
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of its energy independence. Indeed, in his article, Stulberg argues that UAE engaged in
“cheap talk.” It could signal its own benign intentions with regard to nuclear power by
foreswearing enrichment and reprocessing, and facing a plethora of potential suppliers
and no need to secure a constant nuclear fuel supply, it could sign an agreement with the
United States easily.37 Ultimately, while the argument is compelling, it would be
exceedingly difficult to predict the level at which states could overcome the asymmetric
informational issues. It would be difficult to know at what point Jordan’s nuclear energy
reliance becomes too great to inhibit, or the UAE’s sufficient to enable, cooperation.
Finally, a domestic politics approach (using a societal rather than state level of
analysis) would focus on how domestic politics affects foreign policy decision-making.
Given that both countries have authoritarian regimes (though are accountable to their
populous to different degrees), the most salient relationship we would examine would be
that between elites and institutions and the way in which they threaten their leadership.38
On its face, a domestic politics argument appears credible. That is, one might argue that
Jordan needed to appease domestic political actors, particularly elites, while the UAE did
not because Jordan was facing more internal pressure. But, as a recent review of
Jordanian politics shows, elites do not constitute such a threat because the electoral
system allows the King to maintain control over newly elected representatives.39 In
addition, the UAE’s president, Shaikh Khalifa bin Zayed, has benefited from kinship

37 Stulberg, pp.110-112

38 Erica Frantz and Natasha Ezrow, The Politics of Dictatorship: Institutions and Outcomes in Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers) 2011, 6.
39 Andrew Barwig, “The ‘New Palace Guards:’ Elections and Elites in Morocco and Jordan,” The Middle East Journal, 66, No. 3 (Summer 2012), 425-439, 426.
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loyalties and shrewd political maneuvering to maintain tight control over the seven
emirates that make up the UAE. However, it has also been argued that expected future
loss of control of elites may have also influenced the UAE’s decision.40 The UAE’s
natural gas shortage and impending energy crisis threatens, among other things,
legitimacy of the ruling party. As will be shown, nuclear energy would provide a strategy
to shore up petroleum export revenues and maintain its system patronage in the long
run.41 Here there is overlap between a domestic politics argument and the realist
argument. While I assert that the structure of the international nuclear nonproliferation
regime and the UAE’s position within the international system provided it leverage to
negotiate an agreement giving up its full cycle rights, I also argue that subsumed within
this calculation was the way in which the nuclear program would ultimately benefit the
regime.
Constructivism
Unlike realists and liberals, constructivists do not assume that states are rational
actors or that they have a determined set of preferences.42 Rather, under a constructivist
paradigm, states and structures are “mutually constituted”43 – as the title of the seminal
work on constructivism, “Anarchy is What States Make of It”44 suggests. The approach
addresses how identities and norms shape processes rather than Realist inquiries
40 Li-Chen Sim, “Re-branding Abu Dhabi: From oil giant to energy titan,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 8, No. 1, pp.83-98, 86.

41 Sim, p. 86
42 Ted Hofp, “The Promise of Constructivism,” International Security, 23, No. 1, (Summer 1998): 171-200.

43 Hofp, 172
44Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, 46, No. 3, (Spring 1992) 391-425.
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regarding how structures (i.e., the international system) incentivize actors (i.e., states).45
Although it is not necessarily a predictive theory, Hopf argues that constructivism
provides “alternative accounts of mainstream puzzles,” such as the realist’s security
dilemma and the neoliberal institutionalist’s accounts of cooperation under anarchy.46 In
general, a constructivist approach would examine the sources of a state’s interests and
identities: uncertainty would not always lead to a security dilemma; it would be a variable
to be understood based on states’ conceptions of other states’ interests. Rather than take
as a given that information asymmetries can often preclude cooperation, constructivism
assumes that cooperation can be a natural state between actors.
In this way, a constructivist approach may provide an important complementary
explanation for the outcomes related to Jordanian and Emirati nuclear cooperation with
the United States. Under this paradigm, we might examine how the international
nonproliferation regime has shaped states’ identities and vice versa. Some argue that
states’ perceptions regarding the NPT’s “grand bargain” – wherein Non Nuclear
Weapons States (NNWS) are promised full access to the use of the atom for peaceful
purposes in return for their promise of not developing nuclear weapons -- has created a
need for NNWS to insist on fuel cycle equity even though they don’t plan to exploit this
“right.” For instance, as U.S. State Department official Richard Stratford stated with
regard to the possibility of a new law requiring all NCAs to have the same provisions as
the UAE’s:

45 Ibid, p. 392

46 Hopf, p. 186
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…that can be problematic. Why? Because a very large part of
the Non-Aligned Movement and those that might proceed into
nuclear are not people who are going to sign away their, quote,
‘inalienable article IV rights to nuclear cooperation.’” 47

Although Constructivism does not necessarily have set theoretical expectations,
existing literature does use Constructivism to predict proliferation behavior. In relation to
this study, Maria Rublee’s (2009) argument that states make proliferation choices based
on the “international social environment” rather than “an overwhelming quest for security
(Realism) or a “set of cost-benefit calculations (neoliberal institutionalism)”48 is more
applicable to the question of UAE’s signing of the NCA than Jordan’s. For instance, she
argues that “the fear of social costs and the desire for social rewards can motivate states
to exercise nuclear forbearance.” Within this prediction, she argues that states would
engage only in what is minimally required by the NPT and “will look for, and where
feasible, exploit loopholes in NPT and other related treaties.”49 While the question is over
nuclear power and not nuclear weapons, Rublee’s prediction appears to be an accurate
representation of the UAE’s behavior. Up until it began thinking about nuclear energy, it
had not signed the “Additional Protocol” allowing for more invasive inspections by the
IAEA. On the other hand, the UAE did not sign the U.S. NCA and engage in other
“good” nonproliferation behavior simply to come into good international favor but rather
because doing so allowed it to move forward with a nuclear energy program.

47 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation: How and With Whom?,” Transcript by Federal News Service, Washington, D.C.,
March 29, 2011.

48 Maria Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2009), 27.

49 Rublee, 28
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Constructivism may be a promising avenue for further research, especially given the
importance of norms and rules in the nonproliferation regime.
Rationale for the study
The enduring attempts to promote “peaceful” uses of the atom and prevent nuclear
weapons proliferation
From the U.S. perspective, nuclear nonproliferation has long been an important
objective in ensuring international security; however, new challenges to the
nonproliferation regime -- the diffusion of technology, material and know-how; the
expansion of industry suppliers; and the development of a clandestine nuclear trade
network – add impetus to the urgency of global nonproliferation efforts. As Scott Sagan
notes,
A fundamental goal for American and global security is to minimize
the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of nuclear power.
If this development is poorly managed or the efforts to contain risks are
unsuccessful, the nuclear future will be dangerous.” 50

Thus, an objective of this study is to learn what leverage the U.S. and other major powers
will have when or if they pursue more stringent restrictions on the expansion of nuclear
technology than current policy dictates.
Why the United Arab Emirates and Jordan?
I chose to examine Jordan and the UAE for two main reasons. First, they allow
for a sound initial probe of the research question using a most similar system design,
which selects cases based on similarities of potential explanatory variables and
differences with respect to the dependent variable. The similarities that might bear on

50 Steven E. Miller and Scott D. Sagan, “Power without Proliferation?,” special issue, Dædalus 138, no. 4 (Fall and Winter 2009): 7-18, 170-171, 13.
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proliferation include geography, racial and sectarian composition of the state’s
population, regime features, and alliance dynamics; that is, they are located in the Middle
East, have Sunni Arab population, are ruled by authoritarian regimes, and are closely
allied with the United States. The important difference for this paper, however, as has
been stated, is their choice for their respective nuclear programs about whether to
explicitly renounce enrichment and reprocessing rights in a NCA with the United States.
Thus, to be explicit, the dependent variable is the two states’ divergent choices in
concluding an NCA with the U.S. and the independent variable is their relative power
positions within the international system.
A secondary motivation for choosing these two cases is their relevance to U.S.
foreign policy. The Middle East is a hotbed of controversy related to nuclear weapons
issues, not least with regard to Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions and the resultant
reactionary policies of its neighbors; the tensions surrounding the Arab-Israeli security
dilemma, including Israel’s ambiguous policy toward its own nuclear weapons stockpile;
and the United States’ historically ill-conceived actions regarding nuclear weapons in the
region, such as the preemptive war with Iraq over its perceived weapons of mass
destruction program. As a consequence, these factors contribute to Middle Eastern states’
rationales regarding their nuclear fuel cycles. Depending on whether the United States
can meet its nonproliferation goals in the Middle East, the global nonproliferation norm
may be strengthened. This is especially important in light of some observers’ worry about
the United States’ waning influence in this arena,51 both in terms of its foothold as an

51 See, for example, the exchange between Congresswoman Diane Watson and witness Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., Chairman of the Lightbridge Group at
Congressional hearing. “Ms. Watson: there is a bottom-line question in my mind, and what forms of influence should we, as the United States, use with foreign
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industry leader and its ability to exert leverage over former allies for non commerciallyrelated reasons.
The Comparative Method
The cases in this paper were chosen for the reason listed above: to provide a
compelling initial probe of a research question in which the similarities among the
potential explanatory variable provide a puzzle for the difference in outcomes. The data
collected is mainly from a combination of primary and secondary sources, such as
newspaper articles and academic journals. In addition, I conducted non-for-attribution
interviews with a current U.S. government official directly involved in negotiating
NCAs52, and two background interviews with a scholar53 and former government
official54 with knowledge of US nuclear cooperation agreements. Due to time and
resource constraints, I was precluded from conducting surveys of in-country decisionmakers and members of the general population. Likewise, the paper utilizes little public
polling data because very few polls have been independently conducted. Information
gaps constrain the validity of the arguments and the lack of cases constrains the paper’s
generalizability. Nonetheless, I argue that the results of this study will provide
preliminary insights on states’ fuel cycle decisions, implications for U.S. and global
nonproliferation policy, and impetus for a future research program.

supplier countries and their nuclear vendors to convince them to adopt these non-proliferation criteria in their foreign sales or at least not undercut the U.S. goals?
Ambassador Graham: That is another very good question. I don't have really a particularly good answer.” House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Nuclear Cooperation
and nuclear nonproliferation after Khan and Iran: Are we asking enough of current and future agreements?, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 2011.

52 Telephone interview with government official, May 14, 2013.

53 Telephone interview with Dr. Chen Kane, May 15, 2013.

54 Interview with Christopher R. Hill, May 13, 2013.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to understand what has motivated Jordan and the
UAE in making different decisions regarding nuclear cooperation with the United States
and thus access to the full nuclear fuel cycle. Using a Realist approach, I argue that the
difference can be explained by the significant disparity in their relative power positions
within the international system. Within this paradigm, the two countries have different
goals regarding the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and take different
actions to reach those goals. Correspondingly, the features of international nuclear
nonproliferation regime are conducive to allowing for challenges from developing
countries like Jordan in that (1) trade is based on an authoritative rather than marketbased mode of allocation, (2) there is consensus among states regarding the importance of
rules and norms governing the regime (i.e., the “grand bargain,”) and (3) the influence of
the regime’s powerful actors -- the nuclear weapons states -- is not overwhelming. The
argument here has important implications for the prospect of internationalizing the
nuclear fuel cycle. First, it demonstrates that alliances do not drive states’ decisions
regarding their fuel cycle rights. In this way, the U.S. would be foolish to attempt to
perpetuate the “Gold Standard:” it would lose what existing nonproliferation leverage it
has while other countries move in to supply new and expanding nuclear states. Second, it
shows that any arrangement that relieves states of their sovereignty must be equitable and
provide compensation for the benefits they would otherwise receive for developing an
indigenous nuclear fuel cycle. The study uses a most similar system design and the
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conclusions I have drawn have been inferred from press accounts, the existing literature,
and author interviews.
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Chapter Two. The United Arab Emirates
The Puzzle
There are economic, ideological, and practical reasons to expect that the United
Arab Emirates would not sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States,
which restricts domestic enrichment and reprocessing. First, for states intent on
producing at least 8-10 gigawatts of electricity, it may be cost effective to develop an
indigenous enrichment capacity.55 Indeed, the UAE has ambitious plans for its nuclear
program. The UAE estimates that “it must expand its power generation and transmission
capacity from the current level of 16 gigawatts to 40 gigawatts in order to meet projected
[domestic electricity] demand increases.”56 Second, as MacFarlane argues and has been
noted above, “The issue of equity among countries plays a special role in the acquisition
of nuclear power technology.”57 Finally, given the political nature of nuclear trade, if a
country is serious about its nuclear energy program, any country giving up the right to
indigenous enrichment is necessarily putting itself at risk of not having a secure fuel
supply.
The Argument: The UAE’s position within the International System

55 Stulberg, 97-123. Importantly, the UAE’s has publicly stated that it does not believe enrichment to be economical for its small number of reactors (UAE Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 2008, 9).

56 U.S. Library of Congress, CRS, The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy, by 2010Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report , (Washington, DC: Office of
Congressional Information and Publishing) RS21852, March 18, 2013.
57 Allison MacFarlane, “Where, How, and Why Will Nuclear Happen? Nuclear ‘Renaissance’ Discourses from Buyers and Suppliers,” in Nuclear Renaissance and
International Security, ed. Adam Stulberg and Matthew Furhmann (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2013) 50-73, 58.
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The UAE, as a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), has historically promoted its “Third World” goals58 through colluding with its
fellow petroleum-rich states to charge high prices on oil and gas exports. Krasner argues
that the “creation of OPEC was, during the mid- and late 1970s, the most effective
exercise of power by the South against the North since the conclusion of the Second
World War.”59 The power OPEC countries have wielded since its creation has increased
oil producing countries’ leverage in international affairs bargaining. What’s more, on the
whole, developing countries – highly negatively impacted by OPEC’s formation and
subsequent steep increase in oil prices – did not condemn OPEC’s behavior; rather, they
saw OPEC as a “model to be emulated,”60 further enhancing OPEC’s power.
The UAE’s position has only strengthened, not only as a result of its OPEC
membership but also of its strategy to attract foreign investment and foreign talent by
cultivating a diversified economic system.61 Consequently, the UAE has been able to
maintain a strong alliance with the United States. The U.S. trusts in the stability and
reliability of the UAE as an oil supplier62 and the U.S. has sold the UAE tens of billions
of dollars worth of military equipment.63 Thus, today, the UAE finds itself in an
advantageous position within the international system and is taking steps to perpetuate

58 Krasner, 14

59 Krasner, 108

60 Krasner, 106
61 Abdulah al Suwaidi, “The United Arab Emirates at 40: A Balance Sheet,” Middle Easy Policy, 28, No. 4, (Winter 2011): 44-58, 48.
62 Christopher M. Davidson, “After Shaikh Zayed: The Politics of Succession in Abu Dhabi and the UAE,” Middle East Policy, 12, no, 1 (Spring 2006): 42-59, 44.

63 al Suwaidi, 47
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this position over the long-term. One of these steps includes the development of a nuclear
energy program. I argue that while the UAE may sympathize with developing states’
desires to maintain an equitable nonproliferation regime, it is more concerned about the
real benefits that nuclear energy will have on its long-term power position.
Manifestation of its international power position vis-à-vis nuclear cooperation
Realists argue that a country’s economic prospects are closely linked with its
national interests. Unlike Liberals who assert that states will partake in economic
exchange to maximize wealth for the wealth’s sake, Realists argue that economic
relations are done in the service of political aims. Realists also contend that the goal of
“economic (and political) activity…is the redistribution of wealth” in the areas of
employment, industry and military power.64 It is within this paradigm that I argue that
UAE signed the NCA with the United States. The UAE wanted to ensure the quick
development of a nuclear energy program as part of its strategy to maintain its ability to
provide rents to its citizens and its power position within the international system. The
program’s success did not hinge on the exploitation of the country’s natural resources but
rather on the ability overcome its questionable nonproliferation record, discussed below,
in order to attract nuclear suppliers.
The UAE’s national interest – maintaining economic independence
The UAE faces both demographic and energy challenges that threaten its longterm national interests. Knowing of the impending oil and gas shortage, the UAE’s

64 Gilpin, 27
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leadership worried65 that relative economic decline would challenge its various “internal
and external survival strategies – including [a] distributive economic system and overseas
soft power accumulation.”66 Consequently, the country adopted a strategy of developing
nuclear energy to free up oil and gas production for export while using nuclear power as a
base load source of power to fuel the country’s various demand areas. Standing in the
way of these plans were questionable nonproliferation credentials that made suppliers
hesitant to engage in trade. American officials revealed that the UAE’s port of Dubai
served as a hub for the A.Q. Khan clandestine nuclear trade network from which
centrifuge technology was shipped to Libya, for example.67 Thus, in signing the NCA,
the UAE was eager to prove its peaceful intentions for nuclear power68 and was willing to
gamble an insecure fuel supply to prevent stalling plans to commence the nuclear energy
program. In addition, all of the bids under consideration by the UAE contained for U.S.
patented technology. Indeed, in 2009, the Economist Intelligence Unit reported that the
UAE
received offers from three groups earlier this year, and had indicated
that it was aiming to award the contract in September. However, the
schedule slipped slightly owing to the need to secure ratification of a
US government agreement allowing the transfer of nuclear
technology.69

65 Li-Chen Sim, “Re-branding Abu Dhabi: From oil giant to energy titan,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 8, no. 1, (Oct. 2011) 83-98, 86.
66 Christopher M. Davidson, “Yes, the Gulf monarchs are in trouble” Foreignpolicy.com, November 13, 2012,
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/13/gulf_autocracy_in_question (accessed June 4, 2013).
67 Jay Solomon and Margaret Cocker, “Oil-Rich Arab State Pushes Nuclear Bid With U.S. Help,” Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123862439816779973.html, (accessed June 3, 2013).
68 Charles Ebinger and Sharon Squassoni, “Industry and Emerging Nuclear Markets” in Business and Nonproliferation, John P. Banks and Charles Ebinger eds,
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011) 66-118, 84.

69 EIU ViewsWire, “UAE economy: Nuclear bargain,” Economist Intelligence Unit, Dec. 29, 2009; “KEPCO wins UAE civil nuclear bid” Nuclear Engineering
International, (Feb 2010), 4. Though the UAE awarded a Korean consortium the bid to develop its nuclear program, Non-Korean companies involved in the KEPCO
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Therefore, if nuclear reactor components or fuel were to be transferred from the United
States, the UAE knew it needed to win Congressional approval. Its strategy was to
emphasize the peaceful nature of the program through both rhetoric and actions.70 The
UAE, for example, signed the Additional Protocol with the IAEA to allow for greater
inspections of its future nuclear program.
As mentioned above, the UAE’s nuclear energy program is part of a larger
national strategy to maintain economic independence long “after the end of the oil era
(even if that is still a long way in the future.)”71 The purpose of the program is to ensure
the survival of the state through what has been called by Christopher M. Davidson the
“‘ruling bargain:” “distributed wealth, the fostering of a dependent patrimonial elite, the
reinvigoration (and at times reinvention) of historical and cultural sources of legitimacy,
and, of course, the building of strategic alliances with oil-buying superpowers.”72 The
UAE would use nuclear energy as a base load power for domestic electricity generation –
a current limitation of other forms of alternative energies such as wind and solar73 and a

team include Westinghouse of the US, and Toshiba of Japan. Thus, the UAE would be required to sign an agreement with the United States in order for
Westinghouse to participate in the contract.

70 Sim, 92
71 Giacomo Luciani, “The Rationale for Nuclear Energy in Persian Gulf States,” Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security, 18, no. 4 (Nov. 2013):
7-14, 8.

72 Davidson (2006), 43
73 United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear
Energy,” April 2008, www.fanr.gov.ae/En/Documents/whitepaper.pdf, (accessed June 4, 2013), 1.
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more reliable power source than oil and gas.74 Freeing up petroleum reserves would
increase its export revenues and shore up its ability to maintain the rentier economy.
As is widely known, UAE derives its wealth through its oil and natural gas
reserves. A member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
UAE is the fourth largest net exporter of oil in the world.75 However, the country faces a
looming energy supply crunch.76 The Economist Intelligence Unit estimates that primary
energy demand will grow 71 percent by 2019.77 As a sign of the increased demand, the
UAE is already a net importer of natural gas (from Qatar) even though it has the world’s
seventh largest natural gas reserves.78
Energy demand is increasing for a number of reasons, including population
growth and urbanization; market diversification in energy-intensive industries, such as
petrochemicals and aluminum manufacture; and increased water demand to be met with
desalination plants, which also require electricity. In addition, it has been argued that
Gulf States, including the UAE, will become an increasingly attractive tourist destination,
once plans to connect the small nations by high-speed rail are complete.79 Indeed, as part
of its Plan 2030, Abu Dhabi –the largest and wealthiest of the seven emirates that
constitute the UAE and the biggest force behind the nuclear energy program – seeks to

74 Luciani, 11
75 Ian Jackson, “Nuclear Energy and Proliferation Risks: myths and realities in the Persian Gulf,” International Affairs, 85, no. 6 (2009): 1157-1172, 1158.

76 Ebinger and Squassoni, 82

77 Ebinger and Squassoni, note 60, 114

78 Ibid, 82
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attract 7.9 million hotel guests per year by 2030, almost double the UAE’s population.80
“Growing metropolises” are major energy consumers particularly of electricity – which
requires availability of “reliable, abundant, and cheap” power production.81
Importantly, one of the main factors of the growing energy demand is a
demographic shift.82 First, the population is growing rapidly but the number of Emirates
is not outpacing the number of expatriates—in 2011, 11.5 percent of the total population
was Emirate compared with 27.6 percent in 1992. In addition, the country is showing
signs of a youth bulge; that is, where the younger population begins to reach employment
age but jobs for them are scarce. The UAE’s brand of youth bulge is a little different in
that there are a number of well-educated citizens but the available jobs do not fit their
aspirations.83 Consequently, Sim argues, “the bloated public bureaucracy and capital
intensive oil industry are no longer able to absorb the increasing number of highly
educated young Emiratis,” straining the ruling bargain.84 Thus, a bonus of the nuclear
energy program is that it would create jobs for these educated, unemployed youth. UAE
officials have emphasized that 60 percent of Emirati nationals would operate the program

80 Lara Setrakian, “In Abu Dhabi’s ‘Formula,’ a fast force for change,” foreignpolicy.com, November 19, 2010,
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/19/in_abu_dhabis_formula_a_fast_force_for_change (accessed June 4, 2013).

81 Luciani, 8
82 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Steven Wright, “Political change in the Arab oil monarchies,” International Affairs, 83, no. 5 (2007): 913-932, 916. The authors
make this argument regarding all the Sunni Gulf States, not just the UAE.
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in the future and would be guaranteed training opportunities overseas and in the UAE’s
Khalifa University.85
The above factors demonstrates, as Li argues, that the main driver of the nuclear
energy program was the “emirate’s domestic gas shortage and its effects on economic
diversification and political legitimacy.”86 Contrary to what one might expect, the United
States was not pressuring the UAE to make a deal; rather, the UAE had devised a strategy
for courting two Western countries, the United States and France, so that it could move
forward with its nuclear program.87 In its 2008 White Paper, the UAE stated its
commitment to nonproliferation by “renouncing an intention to develop a domestic
enrichment and reprocessing capability and undertaking to source fuel from reliable and
responsible foreign suppliers.”88 One way to demonstrate its commitment was signing the
deal with the United States. However, the UAE wanted to secure American
Congressional approval and did not want to risk another 2006 “Dubai Ports” incident -when Congress rebuked the Bush Administration-sanctioned right of the state-owned
company, DP World, to purchase six American ports.89 Thus, the UAE not only agreed to
the no enrichment and reprocessing provisions of the NCA but also enacted domestic
legislation foreswearing these same rights.90
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87 Bryan R. Early, “Acquiring Foreign Nuclear Assistance in the Middle East,” The Nonproliferation Review, 17, no. 2 (June 2010): 259-280, 260.
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Alternative explanation
A. Regional rivalry with Iran
Some nuclear policy observers have noted that that UAE began seriously
considering nuclear energy at the same time that the international community grew
concerned about Iran’s belligerence regarding its own nuclear ambitions.91 Thus, the
UAE may have had two motivations in signing a nuclear cooperation deal with the
United States. First, it may have been motivated to demonstrate to Iran that it could create
a domestic nuclear program without the technologies needed to enrich uranium.92 Indeed,
the UAE has described its program as “peaceful by design” and as a model for other
Middle Eastern countries to emulate.93 Second, it may have been motivated to develop a
nuclear energy program as a hedge against Iran. Indeed, contrary to conventional wisdom
that some types of nuclear cooperation are benign, Fuhrmann has shown in a quantitative
study that all types of nuclear cooperation “raise the risk of proliferation.”94
While both arguments may have merit, it appears unlikely that the UAE, with a
foreign policy that tries to be accommodative to its Iranian neighbor with whom it has
tense relations,95 would go out of its way develop a nuclear program simply to attempt to
put pressure on Iran. Such an argument also raises the question of why other Middle East

91 Joesph Cirincione, “Chain Reaction: How a U.S.-UAE arms deal could set off a Middle East Arms Race” foreignpolicy.com, May 7, 2009,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/05/06/chain_reaction (accessed June 3, 2013).

92 Luciani, 8
93 “UAE set nuclear precedent of ‘Gold Standards’” The National, accessed from UAE Interact, August 8, 2010, (Accessed April 26, 2013).
94 Matthew Fuhrmann, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
Agreements” International Security, 34, no. 1 (2009): 7-41, 8.
95 William Rugh, “The foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates” The Middle East Journal, 50, no.1, (Winter 1996): 57-70, 58-63; Suwaidi, 48.
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countries that showed similar interest in nuclear power around the same time period,
including Jordan and Saudi Arabia, have not signed restrictive nuclear cooperation
agreements with the United States. Moreover, given that the UAE is going out of its way
to demonstrate its peaceful intentions, it would be challenging to argue that the country
was seeking a program that may one day allow it to create a nuclear weapon. For
instance,
If ever a program was designed to make it ill-suited for
proliferation, it is the UAE program. First, the program did not
flow out of a political-military calculation but out of a rather
robust energy policy debate. Second, it specifically rejects
acquiring the front or back ends of the fuel cycle. Third, it will
be very happy to send away spent fuel and does not wish to
pursue a plutonium economy. Fourth, it is in such a hurry to
deploy power reactors that it is not going to pursue many of
the preliminary steps that other countries do to get ready for
nuclear power (e.g., operate research reactors, which we have
seen in India and the DPRK are much more useful for small
weapons programs than big power reactors are). 96

Conclusion
As neither a member of the developing world nor that of the so-called advanced
industrialized nations, the UAE may have sympathy for its fellow members of the
international nuclear nonproliferation regime that wish that ensure sovereignty as their
number one prerogative. This argument is given weight by the fact that the US NCA had
a “most favored nation” provision in its agreed minute, where the UAE could renegotiate
a new agreement if another Middle East country signed an agreement with the U.S. that
had more favorable terms.97 However, ultimately, the UAE’s substantial leverage in

96 Joe DeThomas, “Guest post: Another View on the UAE nuke deal,” Passport, a blog by the editors of foreign policy, entry posted Friday, May 15, 2009 by Joshua
Keating, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/15/guest_post_another_view_on_the_uae_nuke_deal (accessed June 3, 2013).

97 The National (2010)

34

international dealings made the issue of nuclear fuel cycle sovereignty a less important
issue. Without uranium reserves or other economic motives to maintain an enrichment
and reprocessing option, the UAE signed an agreement that would allow it to eschew its
past reputation for proliferation laxity.
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Chapter Three: Jordan
The Puzzle
A number of factors would have seemed to make the conclusion of a nuclear
cooperation deal between Jordan and the United States more likely than it has turned out
to be. Since 2007, the United States and Jordan have been negotiating a nuclear
cooperation agreement (NCA) that would formally restrict Jordan from using sensitive
nuclear technologies, such as enrichment and reprocessing, in return for the pledge of
U.S. assistance in the development of its program. That year, Jordan and the United
States signed a memorandum of understanding where Jordan agreed not to enrich and
reprocess nuclear fuel on its soil. After the conclusion of the U.S.-UAE NCA, the United
States has insisted that Jordan’s program include the same terms. The agreement would
allow the United States to legally export nuclear materials, reactors, and reactor
components to Jordan; however, it would not make those transfers inevitable. Far from it:
Jordan is deciding between two non-U.S. firms as reactor vendors and those vendors are
likely to supply nuclear fuel as well. Given that the United States is unlikely, in the short
term, to assist Jordan’s nuclear program, what would be the incentive for Jordan to sign
the agreement? One might expect that the Jordanian-American alliance is strong enough
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to incentivize Jordan to cooperate.98 After all, in fiscal year 2012, the United States
provided $736 million total in foreign aid.99
The argument – Jordan’s weak power position and its uranium reserves
I argue that Jordan is strongly disinclined to forgo what it sees as its sovereign
right as well as its as its long-term national security interest – the development of a
nuclear energy program with the option to enrich uranium. Jordan’s power position visà-vis the rest of the world would suggest that it cannot give up the right to exploit its
uranium reserves, which would allow for Jordan to finance the program and to one day
become a regional fuel supply export location. In other words, given Jordan’s current
economic situation, the nuclear program wouldn’t make sense without the ability to
enrich over the long term. Indeed, one rationale for Jordan’s energy program is to
diversify its economy. Jordan is a resource poor state with little source of income. The
regime has survived, partly, by adopting a strategy of buying off its population. Laurie
Brand argues that Jordan formed alliances with its Arab neighbors from the 1970s to the
first Gulf war to maintaining economic security, a key strategy of rentier states like
Jordan’s to keep its populous happy.100 Similarly, today, Jordan is heavily dependent on
the United States for the same purpose. The U.S.-Jordanian alliance allows Jordan degree

98 Some observers agree. See Geoff Dyer and John Reed, “Jordan close to commissioning two nuclear reactors, declines to sign accord with U.S.” The Financial
Times, March 6, 2013 and Kane (2012): “ANY nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States is about why the country needs or wants the U.S. blessing or
cooperation for its nuclear energy program and what leverage the United States has over these countries. And as far as I know, the United States has leverage, be it
military, political or economic, over many countries in the Middle East.”
99 Foreignassistance.gov, “Jordan,” http://foreignassistance.gov/OU.aspx?OUID=170&FY=2014&AgencyID=0, (accessed April 26, 2013).

100 Michael Fischbach, review of Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making by Laurie Brand, The Middle East Journal 50, no. 2
(Spring 1996) 277.
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of autonomy from greater Middle East powers, such as Saudi Arabia.101 However, now
that Jordan’s alliance with the United States is constraining its ability to develop greater
autonomy, it is acting contrary to the expectation that it would submit to U.S. demands to
sign the NCA.
Jordan is facing a severe energy and water crisis in the coming decades; as a
result, “development of secure alternative energy supplies is a top priority for the
kingdom.”102 The energy and water crises stem from four interrelated issues, which,
taken together, strain Jordan’s economic growth.103 First, the country is almost
completely dependent on imported fossil fuels for its energy, rendering it vulnerable to
supply disruptions. 96 percent of its energy is imported and 98 percent of energy
consumption is from fossil fuels.104 Second, Jordan faces a water supply shortage.
Because the country has limited indigenous water resources and water demand will only
continue to grow, Jordan is considering relying on desalination plants, which in turn
would require large amounts of energy production.105 Third, Jordan is concerned with
environmental degradation from its heavy reliance fossil fuel consumption. And fourth,
Jordan projects energy demand to rise between 4.5 to 6.2 percent per year between
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through 2020; “meeting this demand would require an additional 4,000 MW at a cost of
$4.2 billion to $5.2 billion.”106
To meet the growing energy demand and provide both energy and economic
security, Jordan has been seriously considering nuclear power production. Under its
national energy strategy, the country hopes that by 2020, nuclear energy will contribute
six percent of its overall energy mix nuclear; by 2030, Jordan hopes that 30 percent of its
energy mix will come from nuclear and that the country will be a net energy exporter.107
According to Jordanian planners, meeting these goals would require establishing one
750-1500 MWe reactor by 2020 and another by 2025.108 However, the program is
hampered by major challenges, including an insufficient electric grid size to meet the
plant’s needs; the inability to find an appropriate and safe site for the nuclear power
plant; the desire, post-Fukushima, to contract for the safest reactor, which would
necessitate using unproven technology; the questions that have arisen over Jordan’s
strategic uranium reserves, once measured to be at least 70,000 metric tons109 and a key
way to finance the program110; and the ability to find a partner to finance the program.111
Despite facing major challenges to the successful completion of a nuclear power
program, Jordan remains invested in seeing through the development of a nuclear power
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plant. In March 2013, perhaps to generate renewed interest in the stalled nuclear program,
JAEC Chairman Toukan stated that Jordan had 150 years worth of uranium reserves
located in central and southern Jordan, despite the French firm, AREVA, disputing the
commercial viability of the uranium (which led Jordan to end its contract with the firm in
2012.)112
Jordan sees nuclear energy as an important alternative to maintaining reliance on
imported fossil fuels, a major inhibitor of Jordanian economic growth. Jordanian officials
estimate that no other alternative energy technology will provide the base load power
necessary to meet the country’s rapidly growing energy and water demands.113 Even in
the face of major program difficulties, Jordan is proceeding with the development of its
nuclear program, providing further evidence that the country is serious about nuclear as a
way to become more energy independent and grow its economy.
I also argue that Jordan’s decision was based on its identity vis-à-vis the
nonproliferation regime. While it is difficult to discern from publicly available
information how Jordan identifies and wants to be identified by other countries, the
Jordanians appear to be motivated to at once demonstrate a) their nonproliferation
credentials to international audiences and b) their prioritization of nuclear sovereignty
above all else to domestic and regional audiences. For instance, in 2007, Jordan became
a member of the “Global Nuclear Energy Partnership,” a Bush Administration initiative
to “encourage nuclear cooperation while restraining the spread of enrichment and
112 Taylor Luck, “Jordan, AREVA, part ways over uranium mining,” Jordan Times, October 24, 2012.
113 Kamal J. Araj, “Plan for the establishment and development of the NPP owner/operator organization,” power point presentation to IAEA meeting, October 2012,
slides 2 and 3, www.iaea.org/...10.../09.Plan_for_NPP_Operator_Araj_Jordan.pdf (accessed on May 25, 2013).
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reprocessing capabilities.” Moreover, in 2008, Jordan signed a memorandum of
understanding with the United States under which it agreed not to pursue indigenous
uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing.114 At the same time, Jordanian officials,
on numerous occasions, have publicly denounced the NCA terms. In 2010, Jordan
Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) Chairman, Khaled Toukan, said, “We believe in the
universality of the NPT. Jordan does not agree on applying conditions and restrictions
outside of the NPT on a regional basis or a country-by-country basis.”115 Ultimately,
Toukan’s statements appear to be genuine and add weight to the contention that Jordan is
unwilling to change the international nonproliferation regime in a way that would require
it to give up its sovereignty.
Alternative explanations
Domestic political influence
In 2011, State Department official Richard Stratford predicted, “Once the cabinet
is reformed and things have settled down...I think we will be able to conclude the
negotiation swiftly and Congress will be pleased when they see the outcome.” This and
other similiar comments appeared to indicate Jordanian officials wanted to avoid signing
a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States that would allow domestic
political opposition to seize on Jordan’s “pro-Western” inclinations as one of many
challenges to the King’s legitimacy. However, while Jordan does face opposition over
several aspects of the program – whether site-specific, environmental, or financial
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concerns116 – there is also softening support for Jordan’s nuclear program among its most
stringent opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood.117 Jordanian officials themselves may
appear to be attempting to quell the opposition with statements such as that by the
JAEC’s Khaled Toukan that Jordan “will not agree to sign any agreement that infringes
on our sovereign rights or our international rights under any treaties.”118 However, the
quote may indicate nothing more than a Jordanian official’s desire to move forward with
the nuclear program as seamlessly as possible, even (or especially) if that means stoking
nationalist sentiments. Indeed, as Tobin argues, the Arab Spring-like protests were never
a great threat to the status quo in Jordan. That is, Jordan’s leaders were able to quell the
opposition by providing cosmetic electoral reforms, real financial relief, and a sense that
one only need look to neighboring Iraq to see that Jordan without King Abdullah would
be much worse off than with him.119 Given the reality on the ground currently in Jordan,
where domestic opposition to the program itself is diffuse but limited, where Jordan
appears in little danger of a revolution, and where Jordan has taken pro-Western
decisions without regard to its opposition – such as allowing 200 American troops to be
stationed near the Jordanian-Syrian border 120 -- the argument that domestic politics is the
driving force behind its NCA decision is less persuasive.
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External security concerns
Another hypothesis the paper considered is that Jordan is maintaining the option
to develop sensitive fuel cycle technologies so that it may one day develop nuclear
weapons to counter regional threats from Israel and/or Iran. For instance, one observers
states, “Given Israel’s military nuclear capability, there are clear geopolitical reasons why
Jordan would be unwilling to forego the option of developing dual-purpose
technologies…”121 Following a 2007 interview with the Israeli newspaper Haaretz in
which Jordanian King Abdullah II said “after this summer, everybody’s going for nuclear
programs,” (including the Jordanians)122 and “the rules governing the nuclear issue have
changed in the entire region,”123 an Israeli observer suggested that Jordan was simply
reacting to the threat of a nuclearized Iran.124 During that time international efforts to
prevent Iran from enriching uranium were faltering and many were worried about Iran’s
influence in the region as the U.S. was stuck in the Afghan and Iraq wars.125
While one can never discount Jordan’s potential intentions, there are two main
reasons it is unlikely that Jordan’s logic is related to external security concerns. First,
Jordan has long demonstrated peaceful regional intentions, not only as one of two nations
with a peace treaty with Israel, but also as a broker for Israeli-Palestinian peace
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negotiations. Second, Jordan has strong nonproliferation “bona fides.”126 It is party to all
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements, including the voluntary
“additional protocol,” is a strong supporter of a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone,
and is a participant in global nonproliferation initiatives, such as GNEP.
Conclusion
This section argues that Jordan has decided not to sign an NCA with the United
States because it would require Jordan to give up its sovereign right to develop and
exploit its uranium reserves. Because Jordan does not have many options to finance the
program, disallowing the possibility of indigenous enrichment would undermine the
program’s rationale. That is, without this option, Jordan would need to find a different
way to become more economically autonomous and therefore, ultimately gain relative
power– given all of the challenges the program faces, it would not make economic sense
to move forward. Contrary to expectations, Jordan’s alliance with the United States does
not provide enough incentive to sign the NCA. However, an area for further research
would be to what extent the United States is actively pursuing the conclusion of the
agreement.

126 Amy Seward, Carrie Mathews, and Carol Kessler, “Evaluating Nonproliferation ‘Bona Fides’ in Nuclear safeguards, security, and nonproliferation: achieving
security with technology and policy, ed., James Doyle, (Amsterdam; Boston: Elsevier/Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008), 265-283.
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Chapter Four: Policy implications and recommendations
Overview
This paper attempted to answer the research question: what motivates states to
sign nuclear cooperation agreements (NCA) with the United States that would require
them to give up rights to enrich uranium and reprocess spent fuel? The question itself is
driven by a desire to understand how the international community could mobilize support
for an internationalized nuclear fuel cycle – that is, an arrangement where states would
give up sovereign authority over the production of civil nuclear fuel for domestic power
use. Using a most similar systems design, I examined the cases of Jordan and the United
Arab Emirates in their nuclear cooperation with the United States. Jordan has not agreed
to terms of a U.S. NCA while the UAE has. The cases provided an interesting puzzle
because they represented the reverse of the expected outcome: given that the U.S. has
greater leverage over Jordan than the UAE, it was puzzling that Jordan has not signed.
I found that Jordan and the UAE were motivated by their desires to gain or
maintain their relative power within the international system. Jordan, as a developing
state, has less leverage over the terms of international economic exchange than the UAE,
which as a member of OPEC, is among the wealthiest countries on the planet. Jordan is
thus more compelled to engage in trade that would further its economic independence.
Given Jordan’s ability to finance its nuclear program, signing an NCA with the United
States would ultimately keep it in the same relative power position.
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Jordan, ultimately, has not agreed to the terms of the U.S. NCA because it has
natural uranium reserves that it wishes to exploit. While Jordan had hinted that it might
be willing to give up its fuel cycle rights, I argue that the terms of the NCA would need to
be much more accommodative to Jordan’s economic position. While a U.S. government
official has stated that the U.S. may be willing to change the terms of the agreement so
that Jordan’s enrichment and reprocessing prohibition would last for only 10 years, after
which time the contract could be renegotiated,127 two factors are probably obstructing
even this more relaxed deal from moving forward: first, the U.S. Congress, where the
Gold Standard approach appears to be one of few issues enjoying bipartisan support;
second, Jordan’s unwillingness to risk the difficulty of 10 years hence renegotiating
conditions of an agreement that it has very little incentive to make in the first place, given
its options for nuclear cooperation with other nuclear suppliers.
The United Arab Emirates, with its enormous wealth, could make a different
strategic calculation. The country recognized its long-term economic interests were at
stake not only because its oil and gas reserves may one day expire, but also because its
growing energy demand would strain the country’s ability to provide its citizens rents
vis-à-vis employment, subsidies, and outright bribes. Nuclear energy provides a way to
prolong the country’s “ruling bargain;” thus, to overcome international consternation
over the UAE’s history of proliferation laxity, the country adopted a strategy that would
demonstrate the program’s singularly peaceful purposes. When it came time to negotiate

127 Author interview with government official
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terms for and sign the NCA128, the UAE needed to oblige the U.S. terms; if they had not,
they would not have been able to receive nuclear transfers from any of the three consortia
from whom they had solicited tenders.
The nuclear renaissance and nonproliferation
A primary motivation for undertaking this study was to understand why states
would agree to an internationalized nuclear fuel cycle arrangement, as has been proposed
by a number of actors including the International Atomic Energy Agency.129 In order to
do so, it is important to understand better the challenges facing the nonproliferation
regime and why such an arrangement is important.
As has been noted, the control of nuclear trade is shifting from a small,
concentrated number of states to larger group. A shift in the market is corresponding with
what some have termed a nuclear “renaissance.”130 Whereas nuclear power was once the
purview of the developed world, increases in energy demand and recognition of the
climate change effects from traditional fossil fuels has led existing and new nuclear states
alike to look more closely at meeting their energy needs with nuclear. As of March 2013,
there were 66 new nuclear reactors under construction, 160 on order or planned for
operation by 2030, and another 319 proposed for operation by 2030. Of the new reactors
under construction, only one is in a country with no nuclear power capacity – the UAE.
Of the 160 planned reactors, 30 come from new nuclear states, and of the 319 proposed,
128 The agreement was signed on May 29, 2009, Kane (2012 B)
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67 come from new nuclear states.131 Most of the new nuclear capacity will emanate from
the Middle East and Southeast Asia. While some of these states have already made
commitments not to develop enrichment and reprocessing facilities, many have not,
including Jordan and Vietnam. Moreover, influential rising powers such as South Africa
and Brazil have not endorsed proposals to adopt a multilateral approach to the nuclear
fuel cycle (where implicitly states would forgo full fuel cycle development), reflecting
“their lingering distrust of the major powers and a determination to exercise full
sovereignty in developing the capability to produce nuclear energy.”132 Such a response
by these countries, it should be noted, is consistent with the argument I have made
regarding states’ ultimate interest in controlling the means of economic production and
distribution within the international system.
While the United States has responded by introducing more stringent proliferation
measures in its bilateral cooperation agreements, the rest of the nuclear suppliers are
more hesitant to make nuclear trade contingent on fuel cycle restrictions. For instance,
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) opposed a Bush Administration proposal to allow the
sale of reprocessing equipment and technologies to only those states already in
possession of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Importantly, the proposal would
have placed restrictions directly on NSG members themselves and ultimately was
rejected. Non nuclear weapons states also opposed the proposal because it further

131 World Nuclear Association, “World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements” http://world-nuclear.org/info/Facts-and-Figures/World-Nuclear-PowerReactors-and-Uranium-Requirements/#.UfQGND5gZ69, (accessed June 1, 2013).
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perpetuated discrimination in the NPT regime.133 Some states, including advanced
industrialized suppliers, are more concerned with the gains from nuclear trade than with
nonproliferation efforts.134
The question for nonproliferation today is the same as the one Eisenhower had in
trying to promote Atoms For Peace: how to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons while
promoting nuclear energy. One factor, arguably, provides a greater incentive for
cooperation: the threat of terrorist organizations gaining access to the necessary materials
and technology to a build primitive, and one day more advanced, nuclear devices.135
While such a scenario is likely far off, globalization has changed the international
economy, as demonstrated by Pakistani scientist, AQ Khan’s vast transnational nuclear
supply network, which assisted in enabling new nuclear states such as North Korea,
Libya, and Iran.136 There are growing concerns that even with the exposure of Khan’s
network, globalization has facilitated the emergence of parallel global economies.
Implications
Different trajectories to meet the challenges to the nonproliferation regime include
continuing the path of bilateral cooperation while relying on a patchwork nuclear export
regime, harmonize the export control regime, or internationalizing the fuel cycle. The
first and third options appear more likely than the second in that the first would maintain
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the status quo and the third would require consensus by all regime players, not just
suppliers -- whose reform efforts have been met with rebuke within and outside of the
NSG. Thus, these two options will be assessed based on the findings of this study. I
support internationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle in light of the growing strain on the
nonproliferation regime.
A. The Gold Standard vs. case-by-case debate within the U.S.
In view of the fact that there is no near-term effort to create a new international
nuclear fuel agency, it is important to understand the U.S. policy debate surrounding
nuclear trade. Lawmakers, academics, and policy influencers disagree over whether the
U.S. should be pushing for the Gold Standard – i.e. the approach of the U.S.-UAE NCA.
In 2012, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, one of the relevant oversight
committees responsible for approving NCAs reported a bill out of its committee that,
among other things, would prohibit that the United States from engaging in nuclear trade
without an agreement similar to that with the UAE, unless Congress did not adopt a joint
resolution of disapproval within 60 days of its signing.137 The bill was intended to create
a higher standard than currently exists for approving nuclear trade with other countries.
Within the Obama Administration itself, the debate regarding the best course of
action continues. As reported by the online magazine Foreign Policy, there are two
camps within the administration: for the most part, the State department backs the
implementation of the Gold Standard while the Department of Energy does not.138
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However, even within the State Department, there have been mixed signals. In the
beginning of 2012, the State Department sent a letter to Congress stating that the U.S.
would negotiate NCAs on a case-by-case basis. Then, it was reported the then-Secretary
of State, Hilary Clinton, was reexamining this decision.139
Outside of Congress and the Administration, prominent voices from different
ideological positions have suggested that the United States should not squander the
victory of the UAE agreement by allowing other countries, particularly those in the
Middle East, to enrich and reprocess. Henry Sokolski of the right-leaning
Nonproliferation Education Policy Center, has argued that with the State Department
letter, President Obama is going back on the example he set in Prague, in 2009, when he
made a major speech calling for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. Sokolski
also suggested that the tradeoff between having leverage in the nonproliferation regime
and engaging in nuclear trade was a false choice because of the miniscule amount of
direct trade the U.S. does overseas. Rather, he suggested that the United States has
leverage only with regard to nuclear suppliers that wish to do business within the United
States: should they wish to engage in commerce within the United States, the U.S. should
insist that they abide by a stricter supply criteria, similar to that of the UAE NCA
provisions.140
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Joseph Cirincione, President of the liberal zero nuclear weapons movement
foundation, Ploughshares Fund, has argued that allowing any nuclear trade in the Middle
East would necessarily lead to a Middle East arms race. He suggested that the case-bycase approach is a mistake because it inserts politics into nuclear trade. Enemies do not
get to trade with the United States while allies are “rewarded” with favorable treatment –
as evidenced by the U.S.-India nuclear deal that allowed India to reprocess spent U.S.origin nuclear fuel for civilian production even though doing so would be expressly
against stated U.S. policy and the agreed-policy of the NSG regarding non-States parties
to the NPT.
On the other side of the debate, former state department officials have vehemently
argued against the Gold Standard policy.141 I adhere closer to these points-of-view, based
on the findings of the study. It seems as though some of the Gold Standard proponents
have missed the forest for the trees. They may have valid arguments if there were no such
thing as the NPT and Article IV inalienable rights to the full nuclear fuel cycle. This
norm appears to be very strong for countries, like Jordan, that are part of the developing
world and also would see a tangible material benefit from maintaining its fuel cycle
options, should its uranium prove commercially feasible. As Fred McGoldrick argues
with regard to the Gold Standard, the United States should heed this advice: “Look over
your shoulder now and then to be sure someone’s following you.”142 If, as Sokolski
suggests, the United States doesn’t have skin in the international nuclear trade industry,
141 For instance, McGoldrick (2010) and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Nuclear Energy Brief: Negotiating Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” by
Mark Hibbs August 7, 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/07/negotiating-nuclear-cooperation-agreements/d98z (accessed April 25, 2013).
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then it certainly makes little sense for it to insist on a policy that would make doing
business with the United States even harder, especially when “other major suppliers are
simply not going to impose the UAE model on their cooperating partners.”143
B. Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
As a 2005 IAEA study found, there are potential economic and obvious
nonproliferation benefits to adopting an international nuclear fuel cycle approach.
Regional supply centers, for instance, could “provide the benefits of cost-effectiveness
and economies of scale for whole regions, or smaller countries or for those with limited
resources.” Moreover, the study found that such an approach “can provide enhanced
assurance to the partners and to the international community that the most sensitive parts
of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle are less vulnerable to misuse for weapon purposes.”144
Yet, given the difficulty for the United States to persuade even its closest allies to agree
on giving up sovereignty on nuclear fuel cycle rights, I argue that the internationalization
of the nuclear fuel cycle must be a truly international effort. The case of Jordan has
shown that states will not easily relinquish their Article IV NPT rights.145 There is a way
to make any new internationalized fuel cycle approach voluntary but still effective, as the
NPT itself has demonstrated. The key would be providing not only for states to reap the
benefits they would if they were to develop a fuel cycle indigenously, but also for an “out
clause” for states whose sovereign rights are legitimately being violated.
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Limitations
There are three main areas where the forgoing study may have been improved.
First, additional sets of dyads that allow for similar comparison would provide greater
weight to the conclusions here. Second, there was a disappointing amount of detail
regarding the UAE’s decision on nuclear cooperation with the U.S. Particularly, given
that the UAE hired most American lobbyists to assist with strategy for civilian nuclear
energy development, it was hard to discern where motivations bled into public relations
“speak”. In a related way, this study could have benefited from a closer examination of
the UAE’s engagement of lobbyists as a driver of its nuclear cooperation choices in
contrast with Jordan’s strategy. Finally, it was also difficult to gauge U.S. involvement in
these deals. For instance, I would have liked to find out how much pressure did the U.S.
put on the UAE vs. Jordan. Even after an interview with a current government official,
the answer to this question was not any clearer.
Conclusion
This study provides an initial approach to analyzing states’ decisions within one
aspect of the nuclear nonproliferation regime – the nuclear fuel cycle. It reinforced what
some longtime policymakers have known, states are sensitive to their Article IV rights.
Using a Realist lens, I found that Jordan and the UAE made decisions based on their
desire for relative economic gains. The international nonproliferation regime facilitates
an equal playing field because players in the regime agree to its principles and norms. As
a result, Jordan is able to resist pressure from the U.S. to sign an agreement that Jordan
does not find favorable. If the global nonproliferation community, including U.S.
54

policymakers, wish to adopt a multilateral nuclear fuel cycle approach, this study finds
they would be wise to work within the confines of the NPT’s basic tenet: in the area of
nuclear trade sovereignty trumps all other considerations.
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